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Wildlife Crime: The Problems of Enforcement 
Abstract 
Environmental and wildlife crime appear recently to be benefitting from an increasing profile 
amongst those agencies tasked with their control, as well as receiving growing criminological 
attention.  Despite this, those with responsibilities in this area report that it remains marginalised, 
receiving limited resources and suffering from a lack of political impetus to push such problems 
higher up the agenda. This is particularly so for those agencies, such as the police, that may be seen 
to have many more pressing objectives. 
This discussion paper considers the problems of relying on an enforcement approach to controlling 
such offences, taking, as an example, those activities that may be termed ‘wildlife crime’, focusing 
on the situation in England and Wales. Firstly, the legislative framework that criminalises harm or 
exploitation of wildlife is presented, alongside the main enforcement methods used. Next, the 
problems facing an enforcement approach are critically considered, the key issues being: under-
resourcing and marginalisation, the large ‘dark figure’ of wildlife crime, the possibility of corruption, 
the lack of seriousness with which such crimes are viewed, and the lack of deterrent effect. Finally, 
responses to the problems of enforcement are presented, categorised as either methods to improve 
enforcement or, as the author advocates, methods which are alternatives to enforcement (such as 
adopting a crime prevention approach). The paper concludes with suggestions for future research in 
this field. 
Key words: crime prevention, deterrence, enforcement, environmental crime, wildlife crime 
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Introduction 
Crimes committed against the environment and animals other than humans appear to be 
experiencing an increasing profile. There have been numerous recent efforts amongst criminologists 
to expand the boundaries of their discipline to include what has been variously termed ‘green 
criminology’ (e.g. Lynch and Stretesky, 2003), ‘conservation criminology’ (e.g. Gibbs et al., 2010; 
Herbig and Joubert, 2006) and ‘environmental criminology’ (White, 2008). A debate about this 
terminology and the scope of such endeavours is beyond the aims of this paper, but key examples 
include elephant (Lemieux and Clarke, 2009) and parrot (Pires and Clarke, 2010) poaching and illicit 
trade in endangered species (Herbig, 2010; Schneider, 2008; Wellsmith, 2010). This growing interest 
has also resulted in a number of recent publications on environmental crime and green criminology, 
including Bierne and South (2007) and White (2008, 2009, 2010). However, it has been noted 
(Beirne, 1999; Cazaux, 2007; Mailley and Clarke, 2008) that mainstream criminology has shown little 
interest in offences against nonhuman animals and it may be that environmental harm remains a 
niche interest amongst criminologists. 
However, concerns over the state of our environment remain significant, permeating many aspects 
of society. As such, the profile of environmental crime has also been increasing, particularly for 
those agencies tasked with tackling such offences. The second Annual Environmental Crime 
Conference, 2009, hosted by the UCL Centre for Security and Crime Science and sponsored by the 
Environment Agency for England and Wales, attracted over one hundred delegates, with speakers 
representing the Police, the Environment Agency (EA), the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra), the UK Environmental Law Association (UKELA) and a handful of academics. 
Presentations and discussions predominantly considered (a) the profile of environmental crime 
within various agencies and (b) techniques and approaches for environmental crime control. It 
appeared a generally held opinion that environmental crime was taken seriously by those involved in 
tackling it, but that there were limited resources and political impetus to push this topic higher up 
the agenda, particularly for those agencies, such as the police, that are tasked with myriad other 
laws and regulations to uphold. The recent change in government in the UK may impact upon this 
further. 
Proceedings from the conference suggested that most attention was being paid to enforcement 
activities (predominantly intelligence-driven identification of prolific and organised offenders, 
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evidence gathering, arrest and prosecution); resulting in a preoccupation with the role such 
enforcement could have on reducing offences against the environment (Wellsmith, 2010). In this 
case, reduction is assumed to result from the incapacitation of prolific offenders, the disruption of 
organised networks and, most significantly, deterrence. Deterrence is seen to act on both the 
individual offenders (who will be discouraged from committing further environmental crimes) and 
the wider public, who will be deterred from engaging in such activities due to the threat of 
punishment, as well as being moralised against environmentally harmful activities as the courts 
reinforce the seriousness of such offences (de Prez, 2000; Du Rées, 2001). However, when 
enforcement is weak, such reductions will not ensue. Further, we may question whether even 
strong, effective enforcement can offer such reductivist benefits. It is contended that criminology 
can actively contribute to endeavours in the field of environmental crime reduction through a 
healthy scepticism about the effectiveness of deterrence through prosecution and sentencing, and 
the exploration of alternative approaches, such as situational crime prevention 
This paper therefore considers the problems of relying on an enforcement approach for controlling 
offences against the environment. Taking ‘wildlife crime’ in England and Wales as an example set of 
criminal behaviours, the terminology is briefly defined and the legislation relating to such offences is 
set out. Agencies involved in enforcement activity are presented along with examples of court 
disposals, using published research and publically available material to illustrate the problems of 
relying on an enforcement approach. Responses to these problems are then presented, firstly 
considering how enforcement can be improved, secondly considering alternative approaches. 
Finally, suggestions are made for key areas of future research that may help bring conservation, 
crime control and academia together as they focus on ways to reduce environmental harms.  
Environmental and wildlife crimes 
The terms environmental crime and wildlife crime may have different connotations depending upon 
their use and underpinning philosophies (White, 2003). Within the field of eco-criminologyi, it is 
environmental harm that is considered; the approach advocates moving beyond strict, legalistic 
interpretations of ‘crime’ in order to encompass much broader conceptions. White (2008) argues 
there are three green theoretical frameworks: environmental rights and environmental justice; 
ecological citizenship and ecological justice; and animal rights and species justice. Whichever 
framework is followed, behaviours of concern will not be limited to those defined as ‘crimes’ in any 
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given country. However, it is likely that behaviours which are proscribed by law would be included in 
such definitions. It would seem most useful, therefore, to take criminalised harms against the 
environment as a starting point for research and intervention. 
There is no fixed definition of environmental crime, and the behaviours encompassed are varied 
including illegal waste discharges, fly tipping and illegal logging. Environmental law includes offences 
relating to neighbour noise, graffiti, littering, dog mess, wildlife and countryside, planning and rights 
of way (UKELA, 2009a), but many commentators concentrate on environmental offences concerning 
pollution and waste. In legal terms, then, the concept of the environment is much narrower than 
that considered by eco-criminologists, and offences involving nonhuman animals are rarely 
considered (perhaps with the exception of the illicit trade in endangered species, or the presence of 
nonhuman animals that may cause harm to the environment or public health). This paper 
concentrates on activities that may be labelled as ‘wildlife crime’ for three main reasons: (1) a 
narrower range of offences allows for a more focused discussion; (2) offences involving nonhuman 
animals are less apparent in the literature, particularly offences other than illicit international trade; 
(3) it is an area of particular interest to the author that has both global and local dimensions.  
The role of nonhuman animalsii in society may be variously debated and whilst it may be argued that 
many harms are perpetrated against animals, this paper will be purposely limited to a consideration 
of those criminal offences falling within the definition of wildlife crime as set out by the National 
Wildlife Crime Unit (2009: no page): “one or more of the following: the illegal trade in protected 
species, crimes involving native species that are protected or of conservation concern, and the 
cruelty and persecution of wildlife species.” This definition does not appear to include harms against 
animals that are not considered ‘wild’, such as companion (‘pet’) or farm animals. Legislation exists 
in the UK that provides some degree of protection for these non-wild animals, for example the 
recent Animal Welfare Act 2006, The Pet Animals Act 1951 (relating to pet shops) and legislation 
relating to animal boarding, riding and breeding establishments (for more information see 
www.defra.gov.uk). Much of this legislation is investigated by organisations other than the police, 
including local authorities and charitable organisations such as the Royal Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals. That cruelty and abuse of domesticated and farmed animals is subject to 
predominantly regulatory legislation, suggests an area of concern that is marginalised and worthy of 
further attention, but which is excluded from this paper. 
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Wildlife crime can be considered as occurring at the micro-level (such as subsistence poaching and 
individual acts of cruelty), meso-level (such as domestic trade in resident vulnerable species and 
organised illegal hunts) and macro-level (notably import and export of endangered species for 
international trade). It would appear from studying the conservation literature and media reporting, 
that most attention is paid to macro-level offending (which is assumed to be highly organised and 
associated with drug and other illicit trafficking, see, e.g. Cook et al., 2002; Cowdry, 2002; 
Zimmerman, 2003) and to particular iconic species(White, 2005) or even individual animals (e.g. the 
alleged killing of the Emperor of Exmoor, a famously large red stag deer, which was reported widely 
in the UK and even abroad, e.g. BBC News (2010), even though the shooting does not appear to have 
been illegal). 
Wildlife offences in England and Wales are established by a range of statutes and regulations. The 
main provisions are summarised in table one. 
Table One: Selected Wildlife Crime Legislation for England and Wales  
(Sources: Defra (2010); Joint Nature Conservation Committee (2010); Selected legislation) 
Note: Those in bold are key legislation 
<Insert table one about here> 
The main aim of legislation such as that summarised in table one is to prevent or reduce certain 
behaviours (i.e. those things that are made illegal). On the face of it, these seem to be activities that 
cause significant pain or distress to wildlife (predominantly mammals) or result in loss of 
biodiversity, except where such activities may be viewed as a kind of ‘self defence’ (e.g. where there 
is a threat to public health or to property, including livestock). That certain species (notably 
mammals and those which are rare) are subject to such protection, whilst others are not only 
excluded, but are actively reared to be subject to some of the activities which would otherwise be 
unlawful, is of great concern to those writing from a species justice, abolitionist or animal rights 
perspective (e.g. Francione, 1996). But although the author has sympathy with these philosophies, 
the purpose of the present paper is not to critique the existing legal framework, but rather to assess 
the ability of an enforcement approach to reduce existing criminalised behaviour. 
Wildlife crime enforcement in England and Wales 
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Wildlife crime legislation in England and Wales is enforced by the regional police services. All police 
forces in the UK now have at least one Police Wildlife Crime Officer (PWCO), although they may 
often perform this role on a part-time basis alongside other tasks, or routine patrol. A thematic 
inspection to assess the arrangements for prevention and enforcement of wildlife crime in Scotland 
noted that the PWCO role, whilst clearly specialist, was not actually treated as such, in comparison 
to other specialist tasks such as fraud investigation (Scottish Government, 2008). In addition, the 
current austerity measures and funding reductions for public services in the UK will negatively 
impact police budgets (Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2010), and there are already reports of police 
forces reducing PWCOs, amongst other non-core policing roles (see, e.g., Hastings, 2010). 
 Investigations are also carried out by other agencies including the independent charities the Royal 
Society for Protection of Birds (RSPB), the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(RSPCA) and the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA). Information gathered by the EIA and 
RSPB (as well as other organisations such as the League Against Cruel Sports) is passed to the police 
and/or RSPCA. Prosecutions against wildlife suspects are brought in England and Wales by either the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) (to whom files are passed by the police – who do not themselves 
have any prosecutorial powers) or the RSPCA who bring private prosecutions under s6(1) of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. Offences relating to import/export of wild animals (predominantly 
COTES offences) may be investigated by the police or the UK Border Agency (UKBA), prosecutions 
again being brought by the CPS. 
The National Wildlife Crime Unit (NWCU) is a government-funded agency that employs the National 
Intelligence Model (NIM) of policing. It does not carry out operational policing or bring prosecutions, 
but rather assists in prevention and detection of wildlife crime through gathering data and 
intelligence, performing tactical and strategic analysis and co-ordinating and facilitating co-operation 
across other agencies and countries. 
The Partnership Against Wildlife Crime (PAW) is based on a crime reduction partnership model. 
Through the partnership approach, agencies and organisations other than just the police are tasked 
with recognising the role they can play in the reduction of crime, facilitating data sharing, and 
encouraging inter-agency working. Partnerships can thus draw on the resources, strengths and areas 
of responsibility of a number of relevant agencies. PAW also undertakes awareness raising, publicity 
and some training (PAW, 2010). The partnership consists of a steering group (selected government 
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agencies including the police), Secretariat (Defra) and a number of working groups. Partner 
organisations are listed on the PAW website (www.defra.gov.uk/paw/partner/default.htm) and 
number 179 (last updated October 2007). 
The executive summary to the NWCU 2010 report points out that the NWCU is the only unit in the 
UK fulfilling the role of conduit between those engaged in wildlife crime enforcement. As such it has 
helped the UK to “gain an enviable worldwide reputation for the coordinated and cohesive manner 
in which it combats wildlife crime” (NWCU, 2010: 1). In 2009/10, the NWCU dealt with 10,000 
incident reports (compared to 3,832 in 2008/09), processed 3,477 intelligence logs and was involved 
in investigations that led to the seizure or forfeiture of £400,000 worth of criminal gains. Compared 
to the previous year, it conducted 14 times more database checks, received five times as many 
requests for analytical products and increased its staffing levels (NWCU, 2010: 1-2). 
The NWCU, PAW and RSPB include on their websites or in their annual reports, examples of 
successful prosecutions. In 2009/10 NWCU recorded 115 convictions compared to 51 the previous 
year, an increase they attribute to better recording practices (NWCU, 2010). In relation to the 3,477 
intelligence logs processed, 70% resulted in intelligence being recorded only (at this stage), 15% 
relate to ongoing investigations, 4% resulted in seizure by the UKBA and 3% resulted in convictions. 
A further 2.1% now have court cases pending. Finally, the NWCU reports 9,999 incidents relating to 
possible wildlife offences (although these may not all be crimes).  
The failure of enforcement 
There have been many calls for tougher enforcement (e.g. Akella and Cannon, 2004; Engler and 
Parry-Jones, 2007; Gartstecki, 2006; PAW, 2010), harsher sentences and for wildlife crime generally 
to be taken more seriously. What then is tough enforcement trying to achieve and why is reduction 
of wildlife crime through enforcement seen to be failing? 
The reductivist aims of environmental legislation are clearly presented and critically assessed by Du 
Rées (2001). Reductions in unwanted behaviours are assumed to be achieved predominantly 
through ‘general prevention’; that is general deterrence and the longer-term impact on public 
morals, or what people believe is ‘wrong’ and ‘right’. In order to determine the likelihood of criminal 
law having such effects, Du Rées (2001: 109) assessed the “regulatory acumen of those applying the 
law, the likelihood of being sanctioned for offences and the severity of sanctions imposed” in 
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relation to Swedish legislation relating to environmentally hazardous activities. Finding, in this case, 
that regulatory acumen was not a major problem, she therefore assessed the certainty and severity 
of punishment for such offences (using predominantly questionnaire responses from a number of 
supervisory agencies, police boards and prosecutors). She found that both of these were limited in 
practice, thus there was little general deterrence. Sentencing was often seen as too mild and 
supervisory agencies were perceived as ambivalent or tolerant of offending, giving the message that 
environmental crime is not a serious offence, thus there was also unlikely to be a positive moralising 
effect on the general public.  
A different approach to the same issue was taken by Akella and Cannon (2004), who used case 
studies in four countries to consider the deterrent effects of conservation legislation. Using an 
economic deterrent model (citing Sutinen, 1987), they estimated the enforcement disincentive 
against particular crimes for each case study. Calculations were made for the probability of 
detection, arrest given detection, prosecution given arrest, conviction given prosecution, value of 
fine and time from detection to fine (multiplied by a negative interest rate). In other words, they 
were assessing the certainty, severity and celerity of deterrence to calculate an economic risk 
measure that could be compared to the benefits of offending. For all four of their case studies, even 
when very generous estimates were made for unknown probabilities (in two cases the probability of 
detection could not be estimated, so was set at 1) the risk of punishment was low and in the two 
cases where they were more confident in their assessments, it was below 1 per cent. Overall the 
economic disincentive varied from $0.09 to $6.44, whilst profits from offending varied from $70.57 
to $91,967.36. 
Both of these studies focused on environmental rather than wildlife crime and the Akella and 
Cannon (2004) research took place in countries of biodiversity importance, which are often 
developing countries. The punishment structures, including fine tariffs (i.e. the severity) and the 
certainty of detection, prosecution and conviction may be different for other forms of crime and 
other jurisdictions.  
The best source of wildlife incident data is the NWCU annual report. It is difficult to calculate 
attrition rates from the data presented (see above), but it seems safe to assume, given the probably 
large proportion of offences not resulting in incidents or intelligence reports, that these are low, like 
those environmental crimes researched above. As it is well established in criminology that attrition 
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rates for traditional crime are generally low, even more so for ‘hidden’ or ‘victimless’ crime, there is 
every reason to believe that this is also the case for wildlife crime in England and Wales.  
Most authorities claim wildlife crime, particularly CITES-related offences (i.e. illicit trade in 
endangered species), to be big business. The global legal trade in flora and fauna (which includes 
timber and fisheries) in the 1990s was estimated by Cowdrey (2002) at around US$159 billion in 
exports. A large range of often unsubstantiated estimates have been published regarding the value 
of the illicit trade in endangered species (see, for example, Damania and Bulte, 2001; Ong, 1998; 
Zimmerman, 2003), suggesting that a global annual estimate of $9-$11 billion (NWCU, 2008) is 
unlikely exaggerated (Wellsmith, 2010). Seizure and forfeiture of the proceeds of crime can also 
provide a useful indicator of the rewards available to wildlife criminals. Examples include £106,000 
(seized in relation to an offence of going equipped for theft), £50,000 (TAMs), £18,000 (birds of 
prey), £12,000 (primates and mammals), £2,155 (taxidermy), £1,400 (lemur), £800 (goshawk), £500 
(caviar) and £200 (barn owls) (NWCU, 2010). Whilst the individuals involved in these cases have had 
these proceeds seized (some cases are currently ongoing), thus not gained the benefits of their 
offending, many others who remain unconvicted will have reaped similar, or greater, rewards, for 
potentially very little risk (Schmidt, 2004; Schneider, 2008). 
These concerns reflect those of enforcement agents world-wide, including those attending the 2009 
Annual Environmental Crime Conference. It seems, therefore, that enforcement of existing 
legislation is not producing a sufficiently deterrent effect. The questions, then, are why might this be 
and what can be done? 
Problems of enforcement 
Many authors, enforcement agents, conservationists and researchers have suggested problems that 
hamper the effectiveness of existing enforcement methods. These are also echoed in the research 
carried out by Du Rées (2001) and Akella and Cannon (2004). These can be summarised as: 
1. Under-resourcing and marginalisation 
2. A large dark figure/true extent not known 
3. Corruption 
4. Crime not taken seriously (or not even viewed as criminal) 
5. Overall lack of deterrent effect (which will be affected by points 1-4) 
Wildlife Crime 
Melanie Wellsmith 
DRAFT PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR 
10 
 
Each of these issues impacts upon the effectiveness of enforcement, but can also impact upon each 
of the other issues. For example, under-resourcing may lead to under-paid staff, which increases the 
chances of corruption (Akella and Cannon, 2004). Alternatively, if wildlife crime is not viewed as 
serious, fewer resources are likely to be channelled into tackling it. Additionally, the first four 
problems will all impact negatively upon the overall deterrent effect of the legislation in question. 
Quite simply, if no money is put into detecting wildlife crime, if there is little publicity about it, if 
most of it is not reported, if those tasked with its reduction do not care or are willing to turn a blind 
eye and if sentences are derisory, then those who may consider committing crime against wildlife 
will have no reason not to. Considering that enforcement is the predominant method employed to 
control wildlife crime, these problems, which will now be considered in more detail, are significant. 
1. Under-resourcing and marginalisation 
Under-resourcing predominantly relates to enforcement and investigation agencies and is regularly 
cited as a major problem (e.g. Brack, 2002; Garstecki, 2006; McMullan and Perrier, 2002; Schmidt, 
2004). This includes insufficient numbers of personnel as well as a lack of basic material resources, 
such as vehicles and other necessary equipment. It may further result in a lack of data collection and 
sharing tools, access to forensic analysis and more advanced assistive technology (such as 
surveillance equipment) (Garstecki, 2006). Under-resourcing can also manifest as insufficient 
training for enforcement agents, prosecutors and the judiciary thus reducing their capacity to 
effectively enforce legislation and sentence appropriately. As Akella and Cannon (2004) point out, 
although calls may be made for enhanced technology, there is little point if staff are not trained in its 
effective use. 
 Even when specialist roles are created and training is provided, under-resourcing and 
marginalisation may make such jobs unattractive (because of a lack of pay or support). Indeed, such 
positions may be shunned as not living up to the exciting image portrayed of enforcement roles or 
not dealing with ‘real crime’ (Fyfe and Reeves, 2008). Further, the majority of crimes dealt with, such 
as illegal hunts or badger baiting, involve small scale offending (as opposed to the organised and 
transnational nature of endangered species trade), and where agents may receive little support from 
the local community (e.g. McMullan and Perrier, 2002). 
In practical terms, limited funding means that organisations such as the NWCU (in liaison with other 
agencies) set biennial wildlife crime priorities. The current priorities are: badger, bat and Raptor 
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persecution; CITES-related offences (particularly caviar, ivory, ramin, tortoise and traditional Asian 
medicines (TAMs)); freshwater pearl mussels; and poaching. Therefore, the exemplary work of this 
unit and the agencies it supports cannot be extended to the full range of wildlife offences. 
The current ‘age of austerity’ is likely to only make this situation worse. Indeed, despite the NWCU 
being credited by the WWF as being instrumental in doubling the recorded conviction rate for 
wildlife crime in the UK in 2009, there are reports that government funding to the unit will be 
reduced, or even stopped, as part of the budget cuts in the coalition government’s Comprehensive 
Spending Review (Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2010; WWF, 2010). 
2. Dark figure 
The RSPB produces an annual report of bird crime reported to them, and since 2009 the NWCU has 
produced an annual wildlife crime and strategic (priority setting) reports for the UK. Reported 
wildlife crime data should be forwarded to the NWCU, which is therefore in the position of being 
able to produce the best picture of wildlife crime in the UK. These data are not included in annually 
published Home Office Statistics. However, it has been estimated that only around ten percent of 
known environmental crimes end up in court and that a large proportion of offences will never come 
to the attention of authorities (Select Committee on Environmental Audit, 2004). If one considers 
the nature of wildlife offences, it is probably safe to conclude that the attrition rate is likely to be 
even higher. 
If a large proportion of wildlife crime is never discovered, reported or recorded, this will have a 
significant impact on the deterrent effect of enforcement practices even if highly punitive sentences 
were passed against those who were convicted. Wildlife crime is technically a ‘victimless’ crime 
(animals cannot in English law be considered victims of crime) so there is no direct human victim to 
report the offence to the authorities. As such, data relating to wildlife crime is built up from pro-
active investigations and checks, intelligence gathering, accidental discovery and concerned citizen 
reports. There can be no victimisation survey to supplement the paucity of official recorded crime 
data as there is for traditional forms of crime, and it is highly likely that the vast majority of wildlife 
offences are never known to anyone other than the perpetrators. In relation to offences of illicit 
trade, the ease with which items can be globally transported (particularly within the ‘borderless’ EU), 
the difficulty of recognising particular, protected species or their parts and the apparent links with 
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organised crime and experienced illegal traffickers all impact upon the likelihood of offences being 
discovered and recorded (Magistrates’ Court Association, 2002; Schmidt, 2004). 
Not knowing the true extent or patterns of wildlife crime is problematic for enforcement in a 
number of ways. Firstly, it is evidence of the low risk of detection. Secondly, if the extent of crime is 
underestimated this may impact upon the severity with which it is viewed, thus the level of 
punishment it attracts. Thirdly, if the amount of wildlife crime is severely underestimated and the 
true nature of it unknown, public awareness and support for its reduction is likely to be low, leading 
to continued marginalisation. Fourthly, if the extent and nature of offending is unknown, 
enforcement cannot be effectively targeted, strategic and tactical co-ordination will be limited and 
other approaches, such as problem-oriented analysis, cannot be employed. Finally, without suitable 
data there can be no performance management and evaluation (Akella and Cannon, 2004). All of 
these issues are likely to impact on the funding provided for enforcement activities; if it cannot be 
shown there is a problem, resources will not be made available to tackle it. 
3. Corruption 
Corruption is raised as a problem facing enforcement by many commentators (Akella and Cannon, 
2004; Garstecki, 2006; Smith and Walpole, 2005), but this is usually in relation to activities in 
developing countries. It is not known to what extent corruption of officials (working in enforcement, 
detection, prosecution, the judiciary or policy making) may occur in relation to wildlife crime in 
England and Wales, thus this issue will be considered in less detail. However, it is important to note 
that Du Rées (2001) identified a number of common practices among enforcement/supervisory 
agencies in her Swedish research that could be classed as techniques of neutralisation. This was in 
part compounded as these agencies often had a dual role supervising, providing guidance and 
issuing licences, as well as investigating and reporting for prosecution. Thus there was often a 
relationship with those suspected of committing crimes. Neutralisation techniques noted were: 
there being no victim or harm caused (a technique also noted by de Prez, 2000, in relation to 
defences against prosecution for environmental crimes); there being little point in taking any action; 
the ‘crime’ being accidental; and concern over the negative effects that could result from a 
prosecution. These included negatively affecting the reputation of an area or of a company (resulting 
in possible loss of jobs) and of harming the working relationship, which might be otherwise utilised 
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to bring about compliance. If further investigation of working practices in England and Wales with 
respect to wildlife crime was carried out, such neutralisations may be apparent.  
Corruption and neutralisation will result in weaker enforcement, as crimes are not recorded and 
offenders are not brought to justice. However, working practices such as those described by Du Rées 
(2001) may actually be more effective alternatives to enforcement proceedings in reducing wildlife 
crime. Further research is required in this area. 
4. Wildlife crime not taken seriously 
One of the most common complaints heard regarding the problems facing enforcement is that policy 
makers and the judiciary do not take wildlife (or other environmental) crime seriously enough 
(Select Committee on Environmental Audit, 2004). Despite the environment currently attracting 
significant attention, the resources provided for enforcement activities and the sentences passed 
upon conviction suggest that environmental crime remains towards the bottom of a large pile of 
other concerns, such as more traditional crimes (e.g. personal violence, gun crime and drugs). If this 
is the case for environmental crime generally, the situation for wildlife crime is likely worse. The 
under-resourcing and marginalising of wildlife crime enforcement over many years, which has been 
discussed above, may be taken as further evidence that, as the Select Committee on Environmental 
Audit stated: “environmental crime still remains in some areas far from the priority it ought to be” 
(2004: para 5). Thus the cycle of marginalisation, under resourcing  and lack of attention to wildlife 
crime continues, compounded by the hidden nature of such offending. 
It is possible that environmental and wildlife crimes are not taken seriously because so few 
prosecutions are brought. In 2004, it was estimated that about 10,000 environmental prosecutions 
were brought annually compared to, for example, 33,000 for burglary (out of a total of 1.93 million 
people proceeded against for criminal offences in 2002/03) (Select Committee on Environmental 
Audit, 2004: para 8). The NWCU (2010) reported 115 convictions for wildlife offences in 2009/10, 
although these figures do not appear complete. This estimate reflects the very large dark figure of 
environmental crimes, not the true extent of offending or harm they cause. The hidden nature of 
wildlife crime, therefore, negatively affects how serious a problem it is seen to be. To influence 
policy in this area, efforts to establish accurate estimates of the extent of offences against wildlife 
should be prioritised. 
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Further evidence often presented to support claims that wildlife and environmental offences are not 
taken seriously relates to the level of punishment given to those who are convicted. This was one of 
the key points made by Akella and Cannon (2004) in relation to environmental crimes in biodiversity-
rich areas. Table one includes the maximum sentences for the various offences listed. It can be seen 
that the majority of offences are summary (tried in the lower, Magistrates’ Court), thus maxima are 
limited to a level 5 fine (currently £5,000) and/or 6 months imprisonment, although some offences 
attract a lower limit and no custodial provision. A limited number of offences, most notably COTES 
offences are triable either way (they may be heard in the higher, Crown Court) and attract maximum 
sentences of an unlimited fine and/or five years imprisonment. Whilst the legislation discussed 
covers a wide range of offences, the summary fines clearly do not reflect the serious harm, pain and 
distress that can be caused by wildlife crime (as a point of comparison, assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm contrary to s47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, is triable either way, with a 
maximum penalty in the Crown Court of an unlimited fine and/or five years imprisonment). Even 
when the legislation allows for more severe punishments, it is the sentences passed in court that 
reflect the true seriousness with which such crimes are viewed, hence the judiciary have an 
extremely important role (Akella and Cannon, 2004). 
In order to support consistency in sentencing, Sentencing Guidelines are produced for the judiciary 
in England and Wales by the Sentencing Council. Crimes against wildlife are currently only listed in 
the general Magistrates’ Court Guidelines, and relate to offences of animal cruelty under the Animal 
Welfare Act 2006 ss4, 8 and 9. There remains, therefore, little current guidance as to how to 
sentence these rarely prosecuted offences. However, there is some evidence that cruelty offences 
are taken relatively seriously. For example, the starting point sentence for an offender who has (or 
has attempted to) killed, tortured or baited a protected animal, used for or permitted fighting, or 
engaged in prolonged neglect, is 18 weeks custody, with a suggested range of 12 to 26 weeks 
(Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2009: 22). Environmental crimes (in the main relating to pollution 
and waste offences) are also included in this guidance. Magistrates are mandated to pass 
exceptional fines (of up to £20,000) for certain environmental offences and custodial sentences may 
also be appropriate (see Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2009, for further details). The seriousness of 
environmental crimes is reiterated and Magistrates are advised that: “The sentence should...take 
account of any economic gain from the offence; it should not be cheaper to offend than to take the 
appropriate precautions” (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2009: 182). Whilst the guidelines include 
Wildlife Crime 
Melanie Wellsmith 
DRAFT PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR 
15 
 
discussion of the private individual offender, this approach is clearly targeted at the corporate 
offender, as they go on to discuss the need for the fine to have “real economic impact” and 
“together with the bad publicity...bring home to both management and shareholders the need to 
improve regulatory compliance” (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2009: 183). This approach is less 
suited to tackling wildlife crimes, which are much less likely to be associated with corporate 
activities. 
Earlier guidance produced by the Magistrates’ Court Association is more comprehensive and 
includes an insert on sentencing for wildlife trade and conservation offences (Magistrate’s Court 
Association, 2002). Again the seriousness of these offences is reiterated as the guidance calls for 
strong penalties that reflect the harm caused by such crimes. Even in these guidelines, however, it 
was recognised that the punishments being dispensed were not sufficient to act as a deterrent. 
Indeed de Prez (writing in 2000) analysed court proceedings relating to environmental prosecutions 
in England and Wales and concluded that: “despite the common belief that environmental concerns 
are no longer taken for granted, routine trivialisation of environmental offences still occurs in the 
lower courts” (de Prez, 2000: 65). Similar concerns are also raised in relation to wildlife offences, 
particularly for that most discussed area, illicit trade in endangered species (e.g. Lowther et al., 
2002). 
In support of such arguments, most commentators refer not to the maximum sentences provided in 
the legislation, but rather the, usually much lower, actual sentences passed (e.g. Garstecki, 2006; 
Jenkins, 2008; Lowther et al., 2002). Lowther et al. (2002) provide examples of the discrepancy 
between punishments received and maximum sentences available for COTES offences (1998-2000). 
For instance, the possession (for sale) of 138 shahtoosh shawls (made from critically endangered 
Tibetan antelopes) with a value of £353,000 resulted in a fine on conviction of £1,500 (the maximum 
available was £5,000 and/or 3 months imprisonment). In this case, neither the actual nor maximum 
sentence seems sufficient when compared to the value of the goods being sold. A further example 
from Lowther et al. (2002) details a case of forging CITES permits and trading in illegal taxidermy 
specimens, for which the offender received six months imprisonment, three months of which were 
suspended (the maximum COTES sentence was an unlimited fine and/or two years custody and the 
maximum Forgery Act sentence was ten years imprisonment). RSPB (2009) data relating to bird 
crime show a greater range of disposals being employed, such as low level fines/costs (e.g. £125 for 
the illegal possession of 12 wild birds), community sentences and curfews (e.g. an 80 hour 
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community service order and 28 days curfew for illegal possession of 466 wild bird eggs and eight 
eggs of a Schedule 1 speciesiii) and custody (e.g. five weeks for intentionally killing nine protected 
birds). Longer custodial sentences were regularly suspended (RSPB, 2009). 
The difficulties facing sentencers in relation to wildlife crimes are further compounded by the lack of 
specialist training in relation to such offences, and the difficulties in assessing the harm that has 
been caused (Magistrates’ Court Association, 2002). What value is placed on the life of a rare bird or 
bat, for example? How do we quantify the impacts of reductions in biodiversity? It is possible to 
estimate these costs, as exemplified by sentencing practices in Finland (see Garstecki, 2006). Indeed, 
the Magistrates’ Court Association (2002: 4) guidelines relating to wildlife crime stated that “a better 
understanding of the true environmental costs of these crimes” would lead to more triable either 
way offences being committed to the Crown Court, which has greater sentencing powers (albeit, this 
would not apply to those summary only offences in the WCA 1981). 
The evidence presented in relation to punishing wildlife offenders is generally used to show the 
‘derisory’ nature of the sentences passed. Whilst there are clear examples of this, more up-to-date 
and comprehensive data, such as that compiled by the RSPB, suggest that, particularly for nationally 
based offending (as opposed to international trade offences), a wider range of sentences are being 
employed. However, whether such sentences can have a deterrent effect, remains an unanswered 
question. 
5. Lack of deterrent effect 
All of the issues discussed above will impact upon the ability of legislation to exert a deterrent effect. 
Even when enforcement is trumpeted as successful, there is little evidence that crime is reduced 
accordingly. For example, the Guardian newspaper recently published figures relating to convictions 
under the Hunting Act 2004, as supplied during parliamentary questions (Guardian, 2010). These 
show convictions to be at their highest since the legislation was passed, with 57 in 2009. The news is 
reportedly welcomed by animal welfare groups, including the International Fund for Welfare, as 
showing the legislation is enforceable and can be used effectively. However, if the aim of 
criminalising hunting with dogs was to prevent such activities (which surely it must have been), then 
increasing convictions, after 5 years in force, could in fact be indicative that the Act is failing, as 
people continue to hunt. Clearly, the situation is more complicated than this, as increasing 
convictions can also result from increased reporting, detections and successful prosecutions. It may 
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also be the case that a number of would be hunters have chosen not to break the law; in which case 
hunting – a previously legal activity – will have decreased. However, it is worrying that an increase in 
convictions is heralded as a triumph, again evidencing a preoccupation with catching people for 
breaking the law, as opposed to reducing the harm caused by such activities (Wellsmith, 2010). 
As has been discussed, the requirements for successful deterrence do not seem to be met for 
wildlife crimes. The dark figure of wildlife crime is generally believed to be large (e.g. McMullan and 
Perrier, 2002) (thus there is little perceived certainty of being detected and convicted) and the 
severity of the punishments given to those few offenders who are convicted is often considered low 
in relation to the harm caused and/or the rewards gained. Further, decades of criminological 
research suggest that reductivist sentencing based on deterrence is unsuccessful in reducing crime 
rates. This same research suggests that certainty of punishment is more important than severity in 
achieving deterrence, yet certainty is the most difficult element to control. Further, people are more 
deterred by the sanctions of a personally relevant collective, than they are by the sanctions of the 
criminal justice system to their actions (see Braithwaite, 2002; Chan and Oxley, 2004; MacKenzie, 
2002; Tittle, 1969; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). 
This raises the question, therefore: why do those mandated to prevent wildlife (and other 
environmental) crimes seem so preoccupied with blaming a lack of success on weak enforcement, 
rather than recognising that even with improvements, enforcement activities alone are unlikely to 
reduce such offences? Instead, enforcement should be seen as just one response to the problem. 
Other Issues 
Whilst the majority of issues regarding enforcement can be seen to fit into the five points above, 
there are other points that should also be mentioned. Firstly, but beyond the scope of this paper, 
there is an argument that most wildlife (and environmental) offences are really regulatory or 
technical offences, as opposed to crimes (McMullan and Perrier, 2002), which affects how morally 
culpable prosecutors, the judiciary and the general public perceive the infringers to be (Magistrates’ 
Court Association, 2002; Select Committee on Environmental Audit, 2004). Some authorities agree 
that at least some of those behaviours currently criminalised should be dealt with using alternative, 
non-criminal, regulatory frameworks (see, for example, Gunningham and Grabowsky, 1998; 
McMullan and Perrier, 2002) and tailored enforcement (Fortney, 2003). 
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Further, it has been pointed out in relation to the illicit trade in endangered species (Wellsmith, 
2010), that even if trade bans (such as CITES) are successful in controlling exports, poaching is not 
necessarily reduced (Cantu Guzman, 2007; Lemieux and Clarke, 2009; Smith et al., 2003). 
Criminalisation of this trade may even lead to an increase in rewards, as species become more 
valuable (e.g. Schneider, 2008; Willock et al., 2004). 
Controlling offences involving international or cross-border crimes is yet more complex. Again, 
problems of combating international crime are beyond the scope of this paper, but Garstecki (2006) 
particularly points out problems arising from different legislation, search, seizure and confiscation 
powers, and maximum sentences across countries dealing with offences of illicit trade in 
endangered species (see also Schmidt, 2004, in relation to illicit waste trade). It is also problematic 
for investigators pursuing offenders who operate across international borders. 
It is finally worth noting that this paper has discussed the problems of enforcement in relation to 
England and Wales. Much of the literature focuses on range states with denser concentrations of 
endangered species and areas of rich, but threatened, biodiversity. Many of these fall within 
developing countries, for which the problems of enforcement are more acute, particularly in relation 
to resourcing, training, collaborative working/data sharing, corruption and public awareness/support 
(Akella and Cannon, 2004; Schmidt, 2004). 
Responding to the problems of enforcement 
Weak and/or ineffective enforcement needs to be addressed in order to have a more significant 
impact on the reduction of wildlife crime and the harms associated with it. Such responses can be 
categorised as either (1) improving enforcement or (2) alternative forms of control. Whilst the 
former is important, the author argues that, in light of the problems discussed above, it is now time 
to focus on alternative approaches to reducing wildlife (and environmental) crime. First, however, 
methods of improvement will be briefly considered. 
1. Improving enforcement 
The literature contains a number of proposals for how to strengthen enforcement of wildlife and 
environmental legislation. Predominantly, these involve reducing or removing the problems 
discussed above: that is to say providing more resources; efforts to improve reporting, recording and 
data and intelligence gathering; dealing with corruption;, increasing the seriousness with which 
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wildlife crimes are viewed; and improving the deterrent effects of sentencing through greater 
certainty of conviction and/or more severe punishments. As Akella and Cannon (2004) point out, 
however, simply increasing funding and technology for enforcement agencies will not suffice if 
capacity building, training, corruption and marginalisation are not also addressed. In other words a 
holistic solution must be applied (Akella and Cannon, 2004).  
More specific suggestions in relation to EU enforcement of CITES-related legislation are made by 
Garstecki (2006) and include communicating the seriousness of illegal wildlife trade, highlighting the 
organised nature of such offending (this is seen to ‘sell’ the problem to policy makers and 
international organisations, such as Interpol), establishing specialist environmental prosecution 
offices, relating penalties to market and conservation value, allowing seizure of goods and animals 
even when acquired innocently, trade license revocations and reducing sentencing discretion. Some 
of these suggestions could, however, exacerbate the situation, as they do not support good working 
relationships between traders and supervisory authorities (du Rées, 2001), they do not encourage 
co-operation and reporting from innocent purchasers, and reducing sentencing discretion may 
alienate the judiciary. 
The international and possibly organised nature of the trade in endangered species has clearly 
garnered more attention than other forms of wildlife crime, so many suggestions, like those made by 
Garstecki (2006), focus on this type of offending. International strategic co-operation (Engler and 
Parry-Jones, 2006), alongside capacity building (Akella and Cannon, 2004) and working closely with 
international facilitative bodies are therefore also high on the agenda. Interpol has an environmental 
crime programme, which focuses on wildlife and pollution crimes and aims to assist effective 
enforcement (Interpol, 2010). They recently held their 7th International Environmental Crime 
Conference and key enforcement improvements centred heavily on capacity building and 
collaborative working, although the extent to which these activities were being put into practice 
remains questionable. 
A final example of how to improve enforcement provides a quite different suggestion to the other 
solutions presented. Schneider (2008) has advocated the use of a market reduction approach (MRA) 
for tackling illicit trade in endangered species. The MRA, first introduced into UK crime reduction 
strategies by Sutton (1998), recognises the importance of markets in maintaining acquisitive crime 
levels; in other words that property crimes are demand driven. By disrupting these markets, for 
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example by making it riskier for offenders to sell the proceeds of crime, offending becomes less 
profitable, thus less attractive. Enforcement remains the central approach (albeit situational crime 
prevention measures, described below, can also be employed as part of the MRA) but the focus 
shifts from targeting specific offenders, to targeting disposal markets, including handlers and 
consumers. Such an approach therefore also requires systematic and detailed analysis of markets 
and stolen property (Schneider, 2008); in the current example, endangered species. Not only, then, 
does the MRA provide an alternative focus for enforcement agencies, but it also supports calls for 
improved data collection – including qualitative interviews with offenders, data sharing and analysis, 
which would provide a much more detailed picture of the specific species being targeted, how they 
are obtained and traded and the routes used for transportation, on a species-by-species or area-by-
area basis. This increased knowledge would support more targeted enforcement, may reduce the 
dark figure of wildlife crime and could be used to improve public and policy makers’ awareness of 
the extent and seriousness of such offences (Akella and Cannon, 2004). However, it may be 
unreasonable to assume that the data needed to support this approach are obtainable. Indeed, 
Schneider (2008: 26) acknowledges that “...the process of applying the [MRA] crime reduction 
strategy will most likely be a lengthy, and perhaps, complicated one, as it is with traditional stolen 
goods markets”.   It would also require focused, collaborative efforts and expert analysis, thus there 
may be significant resource implications. It is perhaps therefore most realistic to see the adoption of 
such an approach as a complementary, long-term strategy that can be introduced and tested against 
a highly specific problem, which has already received a critical amount of attention and enforcement 
activity. For such a case, relatively good data are likely to already exist, relevant agencies may 
already have collaborated, there is a greater chance of identifying offenders who can be interviewed 
(Schneider, 2008) and if the focus is on an iconic species such as the tiger,iv resources are more likely 
to be available. 
In relation to improving enforcement it must finally be noted that even if more offenders are 
brought before the courts, the rewards of offending often far outweigh the punishments received. 
But as criminological research has shown, even with extremely draconian punishments (including 
the death penalty), deterrent effects are rarely evident (e.g. Chan and Oxley, 2004). Thus, we must 
also consider alternative methods of reducing wildlife crime. 
2. Alternative forms of control 
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Alternative forms of control can work alongside stronger enforcement or, preferably, as first choice 
approaches, with enforcement through prosecution being the final measure taken (Fortney, 2003; 
Wellsmith, 2010).  In relation to wildlife crime, the two key alternatives are: offering viable non-
crime alternatives and applying crime prevention techniques (Akella and Cannon, 2004). 
Conservation research suggests that much wildlife crime is committed as a normal response to local 
conditions. This is particularly the case in developing countries, where first level crimes (that is 
killing, trapping, persecuting and poaching animals) are often committed by subsistence offenders; 
animals are seen as either food sources or as threats (e.g. to crops) (Bulte and Rondeau, 2007; Engler 
and Parry-Jones, 2007; McMullan and Perrier, 2002; Rao et al., 2002). In England and Wales wildlife 
crime legislation even allows for harming or destruction of animals in defence of agricultural 
property. Alternatively, offenders may be part of a larger trade or ‘entertainment’ network to which 
animals are supplied, in which case they remain incentivised by the material gain resulting from their 
offending (McMullan and Perrier, 2002).  
One method of reducing wildlife crime, therefore, would be to make legal activities the default 
beneficial position (Brack, 2002; Engler and Parry-Jones, 2007). In other words, potential offenders 
need to perceive not offending as more rewarding than offending. This may be through the provision 
of alternative subsistence schemes or employing members of the local community, including known 
poachers, as rangers. Animals need to be more valuable to the community alive and protected in 
their natural habitats, than they are captured or killed. Sustainable tourism schemes, again 
supported by and employing members of the local community are a further example of this 
approach as are other sustainable uses of wildlife, including legal trading (Engler and Parry-Jones, 
2007).  Where criminalised behaviour relates to supposedly sporting or entertainment purposes, 
alternative non-harmful or non-animal activities may need to be offered, for example drag hunting. 
However, these will likely require support and investment from influential participants as well as the 
general public. 
Raising public awareness of the negative impact of wildlife crime, and its true extent, will underpin 
many of the responses discussed. This is already a key aim for many charities involved in animal 
protection and conservation, and collaborative efforts between these organisations and 
enforcement agencies should continue to be encouraged and, where possible, financially supported. 
Such charities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are in a much better position to 
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implement incentivisation schemes for sustainable, non-criminal activities than are enforcement 
agencies (White, 2003). Co-operative networks, such as PAW will be paramount in co-ordinating 
such complimentary activities and sharing necessary data for their implementation and evaluation, 
both at a national and international level (Schmidt, 2004). 
Providing sustainable, acceptable alternatives to wildlife crime will not be possible for all types of 
offence, nor will they discourage all offenders, but before turning to enforcement action, 
preventative measures should be considered. As has been argued elsewhere, whilst prevention of 
crime is always preferable to reduction through conviction, in other words waiting to act until after 
harm has been caused, this is particularly the case when the harm being perpetrated may result in 
the loss of native species, or even their extinction (Wellsmith, 2010). With the idea of the 
precautionary principle (White, 2008) already embedded in conservation and environmental crime, 
there should be scope for extending crime prevention efforts in relation to wildlife crime (Wellsmith, 
2010). The NWCU and other organisations do seem to recognise the importance of prevention either 
over, or alongside, enforcement approaches (NWCU, 2010; Scottish Government, 2008), but 
examples of preventative work in this field are hard to come by. 
Over the last two decades, policing in the UK has seen a move away from reactive patrol towards 
problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990), the introduction of the National Intelligence business 
model and crime problem analysis. This has resulted in a changing emphasis back to the original 
purpose for which the police were instituted in 1829: prevention, and it is situational crime 
prevention that has dominated (see, e.g., Tilley, 2002).  
Situational crime prevention seeks to manipulate the immediate environment in which offending 
opportunities are presented, to either prevent the ingredients of crime coming together in time and 
space (a motivated offender and a suitable target, in the absence of capable guardians, handlers or 
place managers) (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 1995) or to tip the rational offender (Cornish and 
Clarke, 1986) towards a non-crime decision through increasing the perceived risks or effort of 
offending, decreasing the perceived benefits of offending, removing the excuses for offending 
and/or reducing any perceived provocations (Cornish and Clarke, 2003). A more thorough 
consideration of this approach, or how it could be applied to the problem of wildlife crime, is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but is presented elsewhere in relation to the illicit trade in endangered 
species (Wellsmith, 2010; Wellsmith in progress) as well being consider by a number of other 
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researchers (e.g. Clarke, 2009; Lemieux and Clarke, 2009; Mailley, 2008; Mailley and Clarke, 2008; 
Pires and Clarke, 2010; Wellsmith, 2008). This approach is included here as the author believes crime 
prevention needs to be embraced, not just as an alternative when enforcement is weak, but as the 
primary weapon in the arsenal of those tasked with reducing wildlife crime. 
Anecdotal evidence (including conversations with PWCOs) and the NWCU (2010) report would 
appear to suggest that some organisations are keen to embrace alternatives to enforcement, 
including prevention approaches. However, evidence of such activity is limited. The author can find 
no published evaluations of situational prevention of wildlife crime. There are only limited reports of 
such interventions, most notably Guy (2008), an entrant for the UK Tilley Awards. This initiative took 
a problem-oriented approach to illegal bird trapping in Cyprus and included a detailed analysis of the 
nature and extent of the problem using the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) 
approach. Responses were based on education, partnership working, intelligence gathering and 
covert operations, and situational prevention methods, including: 
• Increasing risks:  anti-trapping operations and high-visibility policing at hot spots; raids on 
restaurants serving illegal birds (which are mainly poached as foodstuffs); vehicle check 
points 
• Increasing efforts: clearing of trees used to support mist netting in the range area 
•  Removing excuses: displaying warning signs (including potential punishments); leafleting; 
effective media use promoting enforcement achievements 
• Other: prioritising criminal proceedings related to bird trapping. 
Evaluation showed a decline in bird trapping, with an estimated 35 million birds saved across Cyprus. 
Much of this was through reductions in mist netting, but the evaluation as presented does not make 
it possible to link this reduction to any of the specified activities.  
Other examples of situational prevention measures that could be used to tackle wildlife crime are 
limited to theoretical discussions, as exemplified by Wellsmith (2010: table 1). Why examples of 
these are rarely represented in the literature is unclear. It may be that a wide range of prevention 
programmes are in place, but do not garner media attention in the way that court cases and 
punishing ‘bad guys’ do. It may be, as the author suspects, that prevention schemes are being 
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utilised, but in isolation and with little evaluation or knowledge transfer. Alternatively, under-
resourcing, a lack of training and expertise, and significant time constraints may all be combining to 
limit the ability of enthusiastic individuals and agencies to engage in more problem-oriented 
methods of crime reduction. Without further research, particularly in England and Wales (some 
research assessing the practices and capabilities in Scotland has already been carried out), it is 
difficult to know how to encourage and facilitate the use of alternatives. For that reason the author 
suggests that an assessment be carried out of the working practices of wildlife crime enforcement 
personnel, particularly PWCOs, in England and Wales. 
Conclusions and further work 
This paper has considered the role of enforcement in reducing wildlife crime, raising a number of 
weaknesses inherent in this approach as well as problems faced when it is put into practice. Even 
defining wildlife crime and legislating to protect certain species from certain harms (as opposed to 
all species from all harms) is in itself problematic, albeit beyond the scope of this paper. In relation 
to those activities that have been criminalised, even successful examples of increasing convictions, 
focused enforcement and organisations such as the NWCU and PAW cannot detract from the fact 
that enforcement, and particularly the deterrent effect sought from convicting offenders, remains 
weak. Key issues include the under-resourcing and marginalisation of this work, the very large dark 
figure of wildlife crime, the possibility of corruption or neutralisation amongst officials, the lack of 
seriousness with which such offending is apparently viewed in comparison to more traditional 
crimes and, ultimately, the lack of deterrence exerted. These make wildlife crime a low risk offence 
that can, in many cases, produce substantial rewards (McMullan and Perrier, 2002). Accordingly, 
improvements in enforcement, such as adopting a MRA and capacity building, are necessary. 
However, even strong enforcement may not result in significant reductions in wildlife crime and for 
this reason the author has advocated taking an alternative approach, focusing on opportunity 
reduction through measures such as situational crime prevention. 
In order to take this approach further, a number of recommendations are made. Firstly, it is argued 
that efforts to establish the true extent and nature of wildlife crime must be prioritised. This should 
make use of self-report studies, qualitative interviews with offenders and quasi-victimisation studies, 
where the general public are surveyed as to their knowledge and experience of particular activities 
(e.g. awareness of illegal poaching or hunts, ownership of banned specimens and so forth). As well 
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as establishing a baseline of offending, the more detailed information gathered from interviews 
would then form the basis of problem-oriented analyses that could feed into both MRA and 
situational crime prevention programmes. 
Secondly, an assessment of working practices of wildlife crime enforcers in England and Wales 
should be carried out. This would allow for a more detailed understanding of the barriers to effective 
enforcement, as well as establishing the feasibility of applying alternative approaches. It is 
anticipated that such research would also uncover many examples of good practice in both 
enforcement and prevention that are not widely known. 
Thirdly, a wildlife crime toolkit should be produced, along the lines of those already available for 
many other forms of crime.v This would be informed by the findings of the research recommended 
above, as well as the use of existing criminological expertise, and act as a repository for knowledge 
and good practice in the field of wildlife crime.
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i
 The use of the differing terminologies for the study of harm to the environment and animals other than 
humans by criminologists has not yet been resolved. All the key terms have their weaknesses, but for the 
purposes of this paper the term eco-criminology will be used, with due recognition of the equivocal nature of 
such labels 
ii
 Another contentious term, writers in this field have found a need to distinguish human animals and 
nonhuman animals, but have not identified a satisfactory nonspeciesist label. Referring to nonhuman or 
animals other than humans, tends to raise the importance of humans over other animal species (see, e.g., 
Beirne, 1999), thus there is a tendency to fall back on the more common use of ‘animals’ to exclude humans, 
which will be adopted for the remainder of this paper. 
iii
 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/69  
iv
 See, for example, discussions regarding the recently held St Petersburg Tiger Summit and the Global Tiger 
Initiative, which includes partner organisations such as the World Bank, the Smithsonian Institute and Save the 
Tiger Fund (www.globaltigerinitative.org). 
v
 See 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100413151441/http://crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/toolkit
s/index.htm 
